Multiple AWS environments had secrets and data accessed after a threat actor used credentials from an account associated with Qubole. Between October 14 and October 26, the attacker assumed customer roles that still trusted the vendor account, including roles with little or no recent legitimate use. The attacker enumerated resources, read secrets and Lambda environment variables, validated additional credentials, and downloaded accessible S3 data. The original method used to compromise the vendor-associated credentials remains unspecified.

What Happened

A threat actor used identity and access management credentials from an AWS account associated with Qubole to enter multiple customer environments. The observed activity ran from October 14 through October 26. Customers had previously created cross-account roles whose trust policies allowed the vendor-associated account to assume those roles. Every malicious role-assumption request observed in the investigation included an External ID and succeeded.

Once inside, the attacker broadly enumerated cloud resources. Activity covered storage, compute, databases, identity, and encryption keys. The attacker looked for credentials in Lambda environment variables, AWS Secrets Manager, and SSM Parameter Store. A credential-scanning tool was then used to test discovered AWS access keys, Microsoft Entra ID service-principal secrets, and Okta client credentials.

The attacker also accessed S3 data. The observed sequence was to assume a role, list buckets, enumerate objects, inspect them, and download whatever the role could reach. The activity appeared opportunistic rather than focused on a particular dataset. In some environments, entire accessible buckets were downloaded during one session.

Many affected roles were otherwise inactive. In a majority of the observed environments, the attacker’s requests were the only role-assumption activity from the vendor account during October. The trust policies were still present, so the requests worked. The supplied evidence does not identify how the Qubole-associated credentials were first compromised, and it does not establish a final victim count or attribution.

Why It Matters

Cross-account roles are a standard way to let an external service work inside a customer’s AWS environment. The risk is that customers are not only trusting a company name; they are trusting specific identities in that company’s cloud account. If one of those identities is compromised, every customer role that still accepts it can become a downstream access path.

The incident also shows why an External ID should not be treated as a secret or a complete control. The observed requests included valid External IDs. These values can appear in CloudTrail, vendor systems, and infrastructure code. Stronger protection comes from narrowing the trusted principal, limiting approved source networks, and restricting what the role can read.

Logging gaps can obscure the damage. CloudTrail management events record role assumptions and bucket listings, but they do not record individual S3 object reads unless data events are enabled. An organization may therefore see that a role entered an account without being able to determine exactly which sensitive files were downloaded.

What to Watch

Organizations with Qubole integrations should review CloudTrail from October 1 onward across every account containing an integration role. Role assumptions from the vendor-associated account through unfamiliar VPN or hosting-provider addresses deserve investigation, especially when the role had little prior use. Each identified session should be followed through Secrets Manager, SSM Parameter Store, Lambda, and S3 activity.

The initial compromise method remains unresolved in the supplied evidence. Motivation and final use of the stolen data are also unknown. Researchers found a bootable ISO on infrastructure connected to the actor but did not identify any deployment and could not confirm how it was used. They also observed separate malicious activity involving customer-owned AWS keys created for Qubole integrations, but could not link that activity to the cross-account role campaign. Those elements should remain unconnected unless further evidence emerges.

What Defenders Should Do

Hunt first: review CloudTrail for role assumptions from AWS account 805246085872 where the source address is not AWS infrastructure. Investigate activity tied to principal AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS, and review activity from principal AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW when it originates outside AWS. Shared VPN addresses are not conclusive by themselves, so validate the full session and its subsequent actions.

Contain next: revoke active sessions for any affected role and rotate every secret, parameter, key, or Lambda environment variable the session could read. Rotation alone does not end temporary credentials that have already been issued. Review identity-provider logs for validation attempts involving discovered Microsoft Entra ID or Okta credentials.

Reduce future exposure: inventory every role whose trust policy accepts an external AWS account. Delete roles for integrations that are no longer used. Where supported, trust a specific vendor principal instead of the entire account, and restrict assumptions to documented source addresses or private endpoints. Apply least privilege to access involving S3, Secrets Manager, SSM Parameter Store, and Lambda configuration.

Improve evidence: use organization-wide logging across accounts and regions. Enable S3 data events or server access logs for sensitive buckets so responders can determine which objects were read, not just which buckets were listed.

The Larger Lesson

Third-party cloud access is a continuing relationship, not a one-time onboarding task. A role that has not been used for months can still accept a request if its trust policy remains in place. Dormant integrations therefore create live attack paths without producing the normal activity that might remind teams they exist.

The durable control is continuous trust management. Organizations need to know which external identities can enter, where those identities are expected to connect from, and which data they can reach. Vendors must also recognize that principals trusted by customers function like credentials to many environments at once. Narrow trust and visible role activity reduce the blast radius on both sides.

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